



SEARCHING FOR THE “CIVIL GIDEON”:  PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS AND THE JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS 
Sarah Dina Moore Alba  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than forty years after the United States Supreme Court first 
guaranteed the right to counsel to criminal defendants in both state 
and federal courts,1 the need for a civil right to counsel has risen to 
the forefront of legal discourse.  From the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Resolution on the Civil Right to Counsel in 2006 to the passage 
of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act in California in the fall of 
2009, the call for a civil right to counsel is mounting.2  Yet the Su-
preme Court has not yet interpreted the Constitution to guarantee 
this right in cases where physical liberty is not at stake.  Indeed, in its 
last significant consideration of the issue, Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Services, the Court held that indigent parents do not have a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to counsel in termination of parental 
rights proceedings.3 
Although the Lassiter decision was a setback for the movement to-
ward a civil right to counsel, advocates need not give up on the Su-
preme Court’s ability to enforce this right constitutionally.4  The Su-
preme Court is still the only forum that can determine constitutional 
rights on a nation-wide basis.5  Although impact litigation in the 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2006, Cornell University.  I would 
like to thank Professor Karen Tani, my family, and the editors of the University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of Constitutional Law. 
 1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that extending the right to 
counsel to those who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer is fundamental to a fair trial). 
 2 See infra Part III.B. 
 3 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). 
 4 Indeed, several recent court decisions have upheld the right to counsel.  See infra 
Part III.C.2 (discussing judicial gains in this area). 
 5 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field 
of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. . . . Therefore, we 
hold that the plaintiffs . . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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courts is no longer seen as holding the same promise as during the 
1960s, when Gideon v. Wainwright was decided, the courts can still be a 
catalyst for change. 
Indeed, several factors suggest that the time is right for the Court 
to reconsider the Lassiter decision.  Many of the conditions that pre-
ceded Gideon are in place, including considerable litigation concern-
ing the right, academic disapproval of the Court’s previous decision 
regarding the right, and numerous state provisions to provide the 
right.6  Moreover, the need for counsel is growing—low income liti-
gants are facing eviction, foreclosure, and denial of government ben-
efits without the aid of an attorney.7  The Court need not overturn 
Lassiter, nor extend the right to counsel to every civil case.  Even a 
narrow holding will open the door to extending the right to other 
civil situations. 
A promising test case for a “civil Gideon”8 would revisit the Lassiter 
decision by arguing that the child in termination of parental rights 
proceedings has a right to counsel even if the parent does not.  There 
is a strong procedural due process argument for a right to counsel for 
juveniles in termination proceedings.9  The liberty interests at stake in 
these proceedings are crucial and deserve protection.10  Children are 
less likely than adults to have the ability to effectively communicate 
their needs and wishes to a judge;11 if the judge makes an erroneous 
decision, the child will either be unnecessarily separated from his or 
 
 6 See infra Part IV.B (delineating conditions that paved the way for the Gideon decision); see 
also Laura K. Abel, A Right To Counsel in Civil Cases:  Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 531–32 (2006) (discussing the conditions that led to 
the demise of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), in the Gideon decision). 
 7 See infra Part IV (discussing the need for a civil right to counsel). 
 8 The “civil Gideon” is the symbolic case that will persuade the Supreme Court to extend the 
right to counsel to civil matters.  See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of the Open Courts and 
the Civil Right to Counsel, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 22–25 (2007) (discussing the pursuit of 
civil Gideon and civil Gideon litigation strategies). 
 9 For the purposes of this article, “termination proceedings” include all types of proceed-
ings where parental rights and/or relationships may be terminated by the state, including 
abuse and neglect, termination of parental rights, and dependency proceedings. 
 10 See, e.g., LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child:  Client-Directed Representation in Depen-
dency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (noting that “[a]fter performing the [due 
process] balancing test, one must conclude that the enormity of the child’s interests in-
volved in abuse and neglect proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation re-
quire the appointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hear-
ing”); Jacob Ethan Smiles, Essay, A Child’s Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and 
Neglect Termination Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 502 (2003) (arguing that the due process 
balancing test weighs strongly in favor of appointing counsel to children at termination 
hearings). 
 11 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 606 (observing that children’s voices are often not heard in 
courtrooms). 
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her family or sent back to an abusive or neglectful environment;12 and 
the financial hurdles to providing this right would not be insurmoun-
table.13 
Because of the robust support for a civil Gideon and the compel-
ling interests at stake, it is time for the Court to take the first step to-
ward a civil right to counsel by guaranteeing the right for juveniles 
involved in termination proceedings.14  This Comment will explore 
the importance of the civil right to counsel as well as significant re-
cent developments of the right around the United States and will ul-
timately conclude that guaranteeing counsel for juveniles in termina-
tion proceedings is both constitutionally required and a sound policy 
decision.  Part II of this Comment discusses the modern right to 
counsel as determined by United States Supreme Court precedent.  
Part III outlines legal advocacy for the civil right to counsel as well as 
the current state of the right, including recent judicial and legislative 
gains.  Part IV provides an overview of the importance of providing 
counsel in civil cases, discusses the reasons a Supreme Court case is a 
promising avenue to pursue civil right to counsel, and argues that this 
is a promising time for a civil Gideon.  Part V delineates the current 
right to counsel for juveniles in termination proceedings as well as 
the due process and policy arguments for the juvenile right to coun-
sel. 
II.  THE MODERN RIGHT TO COUNSEL:  UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT 
The concept of a constitutional right to counsel is defined by ex-
tensive United States Supreme Court precedent.  Under current case 
law, the right is guaranteed only in criminal proceedings when a de-
fendant is tried for any crime for which imprisonment might be im-
 
 12 See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 13 See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245 (July–Aug. 2006) (outlining current right 
to counsel statutes for children in termination hearings and other civil right to counsel 
statutes); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (laying out the balanc-
ing test by stating that “the specific dictates of due process generally requires considera-
tion of three distinct factors:  First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail”). 
 14 See infra Part III.B (discussing of the support for a civil Gideon). 
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posed.15  In all other court proceedings,16 the right to counsel is go-
verned by a patchwork of state and federal laws, or decided on a case-
by-case basis by the trial court.17  The right has significantly expanded 
over the past fifty years, and the evolution of this right through Su-
preme Court cases provides useful lessons for the potential of a single 
civil Gideon to afford a more comprehensive right to counsel in civil 
cases. 
A.  Criminal Trials 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
criminal defendants with the right to the assistance of counsel.18  The 
Supreme Court has found that the right to counsel is guaranteed to 
all persons in most court proceedings that are criminal in nature.19  
Through a series of cases, the constitutional right has developed and 
expanded over time to apply to certain pretrial proceedings, to any 
proceeding where actual liberty is at stake, and to adjudications in 
the juvenile justice system.20  The “vast majority of [criminal] defen-
dants” now have a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.21 
In the foundational Gideon decision, the Court held that the right 
to counsel in criminal cases is a fundamental provision of the Bill of 
Rights under the Sixth Amendment22 and is applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.23  Although the Court did not 
 
 15 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
 16 For the purposes of this paper, the phrase “right to counsel” refers to a guaranteed right 
to appointed counsel for indigent litigants. 
 17 See, e.g., Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. 
REV. 347, 351 (2009) (noting that “[p]atchwork recognition [of the civil right to counsel] 
and implementation by legislatures form a fragile and uneven safety net”). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–43 (1963). 
 20 See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (“[A] suspended sentence that may 
‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the de-
fendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime 
charged.”) (citation omitted); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (holding that 
the defendant had a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing even if nothing at that 
hearing would be used in trial); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (finding 
a right to counsel at a pretrial line-up). 
 21 Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases:  A National Crisis, 
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1038 (2006). 
 22 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43.  The Court overruled Betts v. Brady, where the Court had de-
clined to extend the right to counsel to state felony proceedings, 316 U.S. 455, 471–72 
(1942) (“[The United States Supreme Court is] unable to say that the concept of due 
process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may 
be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case.”). 
 23 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43. 
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clarify the contours of the right, Justice Black, writing for the majori-
ty, described the importance of the right to counsel in sweeping lan-
guage, stating that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him,”24 and “[t]he right to be heard would be . . . of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”25 
The impact of the Gideon decision was extensive.26  The Court 
soon extended the right beyond the trial itself to a variety of proceed-
ings.27  Four years after Gideon, the Court broadened the right to 
counsel to juvenile criminal defendants in In re Gault.28  The Court 
held that, despite differences between the juvenile and the adult 
court system, due process mandated that juveniles be provided assis-
tance of counsel during delinquency hearings.29  In the same term, 
the Court extended the right to any “critical stage” of prosecution, 
including pre-trial line-ups.30  In 1970, the Court held in Coleman v. 
Alabama that criminal defendants are entitled to counsel at the pre-
liminary hearings required by Alabama law, even though the use of 
any verbal communications made in those hearings was prohibited at 
trial when the accused had no lawyer during the proceeding.31 
Three years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court forcefully 
reaffirmed the right to counsel in all state and federal proceedings 
where there is a potential loss of liberty, even if the crime is classified 
as petty, a misdemeanor, or a felony.32  Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, reiterated the importance of counsel by emphasizing that 
lawyers are “necessities, not luxuries.”33  Concurring opinions noted 
 
 24 Id. at 344. 
 25 Id. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). 
 26 Backus & Marcus, supra note 21, at 1038 (noting that the Gideon decision was broad be-
cause “[i]t was held to have full retroactive impact, the violation of the rule can never be 
deemed harmless error, and the right to counsel was extended well beyond the trial itself 
soon after the Court’s decision”). 
 27 Id. 
 28 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 29 Id. at 13–20, 30. 
 30 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
 31 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).  Specifically, counsel is required at any “critical stage” of a pro-
ceeding.  Id. at 8–9.  “The determination whether the hearing is a ‘critical stage’ requir-
ing the provision of counsel depends, as noted, upon an analysis ‘whether potential sub-
stantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of 
counsel to help avoid that prejudice.’”  Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (citing Wade, 388 
U.S. at 227). 
 32 407 U.S. 25, 30–33 (1972). 
 33 Id. at 32 (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the 
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that 
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”). 
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that providing this right would be difficult because states were unlike-
ly to have the necessary resources to provide the right, but found that 
the right is constitutionally guaranteed even in the face of these prob-
lems.34 
Thirty years later, the Court extended the right again in Alabama 
v. Shelton to provide counsel to any defendant who is threatened with 
imprisonment, even if the sentence is suspended.35  A defendant may 
not be deprived of liberty if he or she is not afforded the assistance of 
counsel at trial.36  Together, the progress of the criminal right to 
counsel cases illustrates that even a narrow original decision like 
Gideon, which arguably only covered felony criminal trials, can evolve 
to provide a more extensive right. 
B.  Civil Trials 
Despite the Court’s support for, and consistent reiteration of, the 
importance of the right to counsel, the Court has never extended the 
right to civil proceedings.  In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the 
Court addressed for the first time whether the due process clause re-
quires states to provide an indigent parent with court-appointed 
counsel in a proceeding to terminate his or her parental rights.37  The 
Court held that it does not.38 
The facts of Lassiter were not ideal for a civil Gideon.  In 1975, the 
District Court of Durham County found that Mrs. Lassiter had not 
provided her son William with adequate medical care, and trans-
ferred him to the custody of the Department of Social Services.39  The 
next year, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second degree murder and 
sentenced to twenty-five to forty years of imprisonment.40  Two years 
later, in 1978, the Department of Social Services petitioned the court 
to terminate Ms. Lassiter’s parental rights because she had not con-
 
 34 Id. at 44 (Burger, J., concurring) (“The holding of the Court today may well add large 
new burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a 
way of rising to the burdens placed on it.”); id. at 55 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is doubt-
ful that the States possess the necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the 
right to counsel.”); see also id. at 37 n.7 (recognizing “Justice Powell’s doubt that the Na-
tion’s legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce today,” but esti-
mating that there would be enough lawyers to fill the need). 
 35 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). 
 36 Id. 
 37 452 U.S. 18, 24–27 (1981). 
 38 Id. at 33–34. 
 39 Id. at 20. 
 40 Id. 
May 2011] SEARCHING FOR “CIVIL GIDEON” 1085 
 
tacted her child nor tried to remove him from state care.41  At trial, 
Ms. Lassiter asked that William be placed with her mother if he could 
not be with her.42  The court denied this request and found that Ms. 
Lassiter had willfully failed to maintain contact with William and ter-
minated her status as his parent.43 
Ms. Lassiter appealed the decision, arguing that she should have 
been afforded counsel at the termination proceeding.44  The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals held that “[w]hile this State action does 
invade a protected area of individual privacy, the invasion is not so 
serious or unreasonable as to compel us to hold that appointment of 
counsel for indigent parents is constitutionally mandated.”45  Ms. Las-
siter petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari in 
1980.46 
Justice Stewart’s opinion for five members of the Court began by 
noting that the Court’s previous decisions had recognized a right to 
counsel “only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he los-
es the litigation.”47  The Court recognized that a parent’s right to cus-
tody of his or her children is a “commanding” interest that indisputa-
bly warrants deference and observed that “[i]nformed opinion has 
clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to assistance 
of appointed counsel.”48  Yet the Court declined to extend a per se 
right to counsel to parents in termination proceedings.49  The Court 
stated that “as a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so 
does his right to appointed counsel,” and it found that “the Court’s 
precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ 
 
 41 Id. at 20–21. 
 42 Id. at 23. 
 43 Id. at 23–24. 
 44 Id. at 24. 
 45 Id. (alteration in original). 
 46 By this point, Ms. Lassiter was represented by attorneys from the North Central Legal As-
sistance Program, Durham, North Carolina; East Central Community Legal Services, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina; the National Center for Youth Law, San Francisco, California; and 
North State Legal Services, Pittsboro, North Carolina.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Lassiter v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423). 
 47 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. 
 48 Id. at 27, 33–34.  The Court cites to multiple sources to exemplify “informed opinion,” 
including the “IJA-ABA Standards for Juvenile Justice, Counsel for Private Parties 2.3 (b) 
(1980); Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 26(a), 9A U. L. A. 35 (1979); National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency, Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 39 (1969); U.S. Dept. of 
HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court 
Acts § 25(b) (1969); [and] U.S. Dept. of HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guides for 
the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children, 
Pt. II, § 8 (1961).”  Id. 
 49 Id. at 33–34. 
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has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed 
counsel”—a litigant has a right to counsel only when his physical li-
berty is at stake.50 
The Court held that in situations where physical liberty is not at 
stake, trial courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
existing procedures are constitutionally adequate by balancing the 
due process elements laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge.51 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented.  Justice Blackmun stated that the Court’s opinion avoided the 
“obvious conclusion that due process requires” a right to counsel for 
an indigent parent and instead “revive[d] an ad hoc approach tho-
roughly discredited nearly [twenty] years ago in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.”52  Justice Stevens also dissented, recognizing that deprivation 
of parental rights may be more grievous than being sent to jail and 
that “[t]he plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that both deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law,” 
including the appointment of counsel.53  Justice Stevens wrote that 
any policy fears of the majority were unfounded because the right to 
counsel is the “essence” of due process, and any slippery slope prob-
lems can be dealt with without difficulty.54  Despite continuing de-
bates regarding the suitability of the Lassiter decision, the Court has 
not spoken on the civil right to counsel in cases not involving a depri-
vation of liberty since.55 
 
 50 Id. at 26–27. 
 51 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that while individuals have a property right in social securi-
ty benefits that implicates the need for due process in order to terminate such rights, 
termination of such benefits does not require a pre-termination hearing to satisfy due 
process).  Courts must consider (a) the private interest affected by the government ac-
tion; (b) the risk of incorrect action because of the procedures used, and the probable 
value of additional safeguards; and (c) the government’s interest.  Id. at 334–35. 
 52 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54 Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel In Civil Cases Revisited:  The Proper Influence of Poverty 
and the Case for Reversing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1057, 1091 (2010). 
 55 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 350–51.  On November 1, 2010, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the case Turner v. Rogers, which involved the appointment of counsel 
in civil contempt cases.  Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 
504, 504 (2010).  The Court will determine whether the right to counsel applies in situa-
tions where incarceration is coercive rather than punitive.  See Adam Liptak, Justices to 
Weigh Broader Right to Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at A22.  Even if the Court de-
termines that defendants in these cases do have a right to assistance of counsel, this case 
would not be a “civil Gideon,” because the right to counsel will still only apply in cases in-
volving incarceration, or the “deprivation of physical liberty” on which the Court relied in 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27. 
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III.  THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE AND AFTER LASSITER 
The ideal of a civil right to counsel did not begin or end with Las-
siter.  The civil right to counsel has existed in England since the mid-
dle ages and is reflected in at least one state constitution.56  Even after 
Lassiter, the right is championed by lawyers and bar associations 
across the country, with support growing especially strong since the 
fortieth anniversary of Gideon in 2003.57  States seem to be responding 
to the movement as well—many have recently legislatively or judicial-
ly expanded right to counsel in civil cases, especially for child custody 
issues.58  The momentum is increasing, but the civil right to counsel is 
still far from comprehensive, which is why a Supreme Court decision 
on the right is so vital.59 
A.  The Civil Right to Counsel Internationally 
Although the United States does not yet consistently guarantee 
the civil right to counsel, the right is widely recognized international-
ly as fundamental to national legal systems.60  As the American Bar As-
sociation (“ABA”) has noted, “[m]ost European and Commonwealth 
countries have had a right to counsel in civil cases for decades or 
even centuries, entitling all poor people to legal assistance when 
 
 56 See, e.g., ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 507, 
514 (2006) (noting that several American colonies imported an English statute which 
granted indigent litigants a right to counsel in civil cases); Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed 
Is, Once Again, Justice Denied:  The Overdue Rule to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 
59, 60–61 (2007) (noting that the notion of a civil right to counsel did not begin with 
Gideon or the ABA Resolution on Right to Counsel, but rather “[a]mong its earliest trac-
ings is a Tudor codification”); Wade Henderson, Keynote Address:  The Evolution and Impor-
tance of Creating a Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2009) (“As early as 
the 1200s, the English courts provided free legal assistance for the poor. . . . [The civil 
right to counsel] principle is reflected in the State of Maryland’s constitution, and many 
other states.”); Alan Houseman, Civil Gideon:  The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 25 
CORNERSTONE 14 (2003), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1075736245.67/civilgideon.pdf (“When Maryland became a state it adopted all English 
law that was effective on July 4, 1776 which included a provision on right to counsel in civ-
il cases.”). 
 57 Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 892 
(2009) (“In 2003, the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
Gideon v. Wainwright sparked a resurgence of interest in extending that ruling’s guarantee 
of counsel in criminal cases to civil cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 58 See infra Part III.C (discussing recent expansions of the right to counsel around the coun-
try). 
 59 Clare Pastore, A Civil Right To Counsel:  Closer To Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1065 
(2009) (“[T]here is growing momentum for expanding the right to counsel in civil cas-
es.”). 
 60 See ABA, supra note 56, at 514. 
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needed.”61  France has had the right since 1852, Italy since 1865, and 
Germany codified the right when it became one state in 1877.62  Near-
ly all other European countries codified the right in the late nine-
teenth or early twentieth century.63  Today, over fifty countries pro-
vide attorneys as a matter of right in many civil cases, including 
countries recently freed from oppressive regimes, such as Poland and 
South Africa.64 
English courts appointed attorneys for indigent litigants begin-
ning in the thirteenth century, and the English Parliament codified 
the right in 1495.65  This history is especially significant for the United 
States because English common law is the basis for American law.  
Indeed, some colonies chose to adopt all English law that was effec-
tive on July 4, 1776, including the existing provision on civil right to 
counsel.66  The fact that this right persevered over five hundred years 
of English common law illustrates that guaranteeing counsel is a basic 
tenet of the legal system on which ours is founded.67  Further, inter-
national practices of civil right to counsel are important because of 
the Supreme Court’s willingness in recent years to refer to interna-
tional norms as authority when interpreting the United States Consti-
tution.68 
 
 61 Id. at 510. 
 62 Id. at 514 (“France created such a statutory right in 1852, Italy did so when Garibaldi uni-
fied the country in 1865, and Germany followed suit when it became a nation in 1877.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Henderson, supra note 56, at 79 (“Today, more than fifty foreign countries provide legal 
representation in cases as a matter of right. . . . Poland, recently freed from Communism 
[recognizes the right].  So does South Africa, recently freed from apartheid.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 65 ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“As early as the 13th and 14th centuries English courts were 
appointing attorneys for such litigants, a right that Parliament codified in 1495.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 56, at 14 (“The Maryland constitutional argument [for a 
civil right to counsel] is somewhat unique though possibly relevant to other states that 
were one of the original 13 colonies.  When Maryland became a state it adopted all Eng-
lish law that was effective on July 4, 1776 which included a provision on right to counsel 
in civil cases.”); see also ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“The common law has a long history of 
granting indigent litigants a right to counsel in civil cases.  As early as the 13th and 14th 
centuries English courts were appointing attorneys for such litigants, a right that Parlia-
ment codified in 1495.  Several American colonies imported this statute and its right to 
counsel as part of the common law they adopted from the mother country and, it has 
been argued, this nascent right continues to the current day.”). 
 67 ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“[A]t a minimum the venerable age and persistence of [the 
civil] right [to counsel] in the common law tradition suggests the fundamental impor-
tance that tradition, which is the basis of American law, accords guaranteeing poor 
people equality before the law and furnishing them the lawyers required to make that 
guarantee a reality.”) (footnote omitted). 
 68 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[T]he Court has referred to the 
laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation 
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B.  Legal Opinion 
The fortieth anniversary of Gideon generated interest in finally en-
suring the civil right to counsel in the United States.69  Advocates 
formed coalitions to coordinate strategies, and the ABA created the 
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice.70  In 2006, the ABA adopted the 
Task Force’s proposed resolution urging federal and state govern-
ments to provide counsel as a matter of right and free of charge to 
low income persons involved in proceedings “where basic human 
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, 
health or child custody.”71 
State bar associations also advocate locally for the civil right to 
counsel.  In 2009, the New York State Bar Association released a re-
port calling for an expansion of the civil right to counsel in New York 
State.72  The Minnesota State Bar Association73 and the Boston Bar As-
 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (citing to several cases from the European Court of 
Human Rights and noting that “[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been ac-
cepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries”); Atkins v. Virgin-
ia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (referring to international norms and standards when 
barring execution of mentally disabled defendants); see also Josh Hsu, Looking Beyond the 
Boundaries:  Incorporating International Norms into the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 36 N.M. L. REV. 75, 75–77 (2006) (discussing the Court’s usage of international 
norms in constitutional jurisprudence). 
 69 See Rhode, supra note 57, at 892 (2009) (“In 2003, the fortieth anniversary of the Su-
preme Court’s landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright sparked a resurgence of interest in 
extending that ruling’s guarantee of counsel in criminal cases to civil cases.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 70 One such coalition was the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, which was 
founded in 2004 after a workshop on the civil right to counsel held at the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association’s annual conference.  See Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to 
Counsel, About the Coalition:  Coalition Basics, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/about_
the_coalition/coalition_basics/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (providing basic information 
about the Coalition); see also Rhode, supra note 57, at 892 (“[After the fortieth anniversary 
of Gideon,] [a]dvocates formed the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel and 
coordinated litigation and legislative strategies.  The ABA created the Task Force on 
Access to Civil Justice and, in 2006, adopted its proposed resolution supporting a ‘civil 
Gideon.’”). 
 71 Rhode, supra note 57, at 892; see also ABA, supra note 56, at 508 (urging “federal, state and 
territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to 
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human 
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child cus-
tody”).  Twelve state and local bar associations co-sponsored the resolution.  Laura K. 
Abel, Toward a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in New York State:  A Report of the New York State 
Bar Association, 25 TOURO L. REV. 31, 35 (2009). 
 72 Abel, supra note 71, at 33–37 (“A core goal of the New York State Bar Association 
(“NYSBA”) is to ensure that the justice system works, and that it works for all New Yorkers.  
To that end, NYSBA promotes several measures aimed at ensuring that all New Yorkers, 
regardless of income, have access to lawyers to meet their important civil legal 
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sociation have formed task forces on the right.74  The California Con-
ference of Delegates of California Bar Associations,75 Massachusetts 
Bar Association,76 Pennsylvania Bar Association,77 and Alaska Bar As-
sociation78 have each passed civil right to counsel resolutions.  These 
resolutions urge state governments to expand or establish the civil 
right to counsel in order to provide legal assistance to low income li-
tigants in many civil cases. 
 
needs. . . . Since the early 1970s, New York State has had the broadest right to counsel in 
family cases of any state.”) (citation omitted). 
 73 See Dorsey & Whitney L.L.P., The Right to Civil Counsel Under Minnesota Law:  A White Paper 
Presented to the Minnesota State Bar Association’s Civil Gideon Task Force, at 3–4 (Sept. 11, 
2008), available at http://www.mnbar.org/committees/CivilGideon/MaterialsReports/
Civil%20Gideon%20White%20Paper%20-%20Dorsey-Whitney.pdf (discussing the poten-
tial for expanding the right to court-appointed counsel).  For a list of state bar Civil Gide-
on resolutions, see Abel, supra note 71, at 36. 
 74 See Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, Boston Bar Ass’n, Gideon’s New 
Trumpet:  Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in Massachusetts, at 2 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf (reporting “the Task 
Force’s recommendations to establish starting points for an expanded civil right to coun-
sel”). 
 75 See Cal. Conference of Delegates of Cal. Bar Ass’ns, Right to Counsel Resolution (Oct. 2006), 
available at http://www.calconference.org/pdfs/R2006/01-06-06.pdf (“All people shall 
have a right to the assistance of counsel in cases before forums in which lawyers are per-
mitted.  Those who cannot afford such representation shall be provided counsel when 
needed to protect their rights to basic human needs, including sustenance, shelter, safety, 
health, child custody, and other categories the Legislature may identify in subsequent leg-
islation.”). 
 76 See Mass. Bar Ass’n, House of Delegates Unanimously Supports Principle of Civil Gideon, 
LAWYERS E-JOURNAL (May 23, 2007), http://www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/
publications/e-journal/2007/may/523/hod (“[T]he House of Delegates voted unanim-
ously . . . to support a civil Gideon resolution, urging the state to provide legal counsel to 
low income people in civil matters involving basic human needs.”). 
77  See Access to Justice Comm., Pa. Bar Ass’n, Resolution to Cosponsor the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Resolutions to Adopt the Proposed ABA Model Access Act and ABA Basic Principles of a Right 
to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings (June 25, 2010), available at  http://www.pabar.org
/public/committees/lspublic/Resolutions/Resolution%20to%20Cosponsor%20ABA%20
Model%20Act%20approved%20_2_.pdf (“Resolved, [t]hat the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion urges the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide legal counsel as a matter of 
right to low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic 
human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or 
child custody.”). 
 78 See Pro Bono Comm., Alaska Bar Ass’n, Resolution in Support of Recognizing a Right to Coun-
sel for Indigent Individuals in Certain Civil Cases (2008), available at 
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/alaska_bar_resolution_9_2_2008.pdf (“[T]he Alaska 
Bar Association urges the State of Alaska to provide legal counsel as a matter of right to 
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human 
needs are at stake.”). 
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C.  Civil Right to Counsel:  Expansion of State-Based Rights 
Although access to counsel is nowhere near comprehensive,79 
much ground work has already been laid for a civil right to counsel in 
certain situations.  Legislative gains in this area have been promising:  
in some jurisdictions, lawyers are available by right in cases involving 
child custody, involuntary commitment and guardianship, orders of 
protection, and civil contempt.80  Judicial gains have also been steady, 
particularly in the child custody arena.  Although these gains have 
not been sufficient, they demonstrate that opinion favors expansion 
of the right. 
1.  Legislative Gains 
The most extensive civil right to counsel exists in California, 
where the legislature adopted a bill to provide a right to counsel 
through partnerships between courts and legal service agencies.81  In 
September 2009, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 
590, the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act.  The Act provides that the 
state will implement model pilot projects to ensure that “[l]egal 
counsel . . . [is] appointed to represent low-income parties in civil 
matters involving critical issues affecting basic human needs.”82  “Basic 
human needs” include “housing-related matters, domestic violence 
and civil harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships, 
guardianships of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to 
obtain sole legal or physical custody of a child.”83  Although these cat-
egories seem expansive, they cover only a fraction of total civil litiga-
 
 79 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 17, at 350–51 (“The gains in right to counsel in civil matters 
have thus far been legislative, and while significant, adoption has been slow, less than co-
hesive or thematic, and inconsistent across the country.  Patchwork recognition and im-
plementation by legislatures form a fragile and uneven safety net.”). 
 80 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (“Lawyers are available for appointment in some juris-
dictions for matters such as child custody, orders of protection, civil contempt, involunta-
ry commitment, and guardianship.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Recent Legislation, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes 
Pilot Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 
1534 (2010) (outlining the requirements of Assembly Bill 590). 
 82 See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010) (quoting 
portion of the act discussing civil legal representation for low-income parties). 
 83 See id. at ch. 2.1 68651(b)(1) (enumerating some examples of basic human needs).  Cali-
fornia already mandates appointment of counsel for children in termination hearings 
and appeals, so the Act will not affect that right.  See Whytni Kernodle Frederick & Debo-
rah L. Sams, A Child’s Right to Counsel:  First Star’s National Report Card on Legal Representa-
tion for Children, at 12 (2007) (summarizing that California mandates legal representation 
for children), available at http://www.firststar.org/documents/
FIRSTSTARReportCard07.pdf. 
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tion, so the bill does not create an all-encompassing civil right to 
counsel.84  Some commentators have argued that the Act will “result 
in more waste in the court system,”85 but others have hailed the bill as 
“unprecedented,” “cost-effective,” and “innovative.”86 
The right to counsel in civil cases in other states is by no means as 
comprehensive, but is growing steadily.87  Since the civil Gideon 
movement gained momentum in the early twenty-first century, nine 
states have enacted new laws expanding the right to counsel around 
the country, particularly in custody cases.88 
Alabama and Louisiana extended the right to counsel to parents 
in termination proceedings brought by both the state and private 
 
 84 See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010); Recent 
Legislation, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot Programs to 
Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533 (2010) (“Since 
these categories cover[] only a small fraction of total civil litigation . . . the legislation did 
little to address the formation of a serious nation-wide ‘justice gap’ between what was 
needed to meet the civil legal needs of the poor and the total amount of services actually 
available.”). 
 85 Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at A3 (ex-
plaining new California law that gives low-income residents the right to an attorney in civ-
il matters). 
 86 Editorial, (Penny) Wise Justice for California, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A30 (describing 
the bill as a smart, cost-effective way to provide civil case legal counsel to those who can-
not afford counsel); Editorial, Waiting in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A22 (“Two 
innovative bills recently approved by the California Legislature are on Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s desk.  One would make the state’s justice system fairer and more effi-
cient.  The other would improve public safety.  Neither would add to California’s fiscal 
woes, and both would set a worthy example for the nation.”); Carol J. Williams, California 
Gives the Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at A8 (“California is embarking 
on an unprecedented civil court experiment to pay for attorneys to represent poor liti-
gants who find themselves battling powerful adversaries in vital matters affecting their li-
velihoods and families.”). 
 87 See Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the Civil 
Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2009) (discussing legislation expanding 
the civil right to counsel in Louisiana, New York, and Florida); see also 2005 Fla. Sess. Law. 
Serv. 245 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(5) (West 2008)) (requiring legal repre-
sentation for children who may be eligible for special immigrant status); 2008 La. Sess. 
Law Serv. 778 (West) (enacted July 7, 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/
billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=50 2952 (affording a right to counsel to certain par-
ents facing termination of their parental rights); 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws 538 (McKinney) 
(codified at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35.8 (McKinney 2008)) (expanding the right to counsel in 
child custody cases); Brennan Center for Justice, California Recognizes Civil Right to Counsel 
and Creates Pilot Program, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Oct. 13, 2009, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/californiaab590/ (describing codifi-
cation of the historic Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act). 
 88 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind 
New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1088–89 (2009) (discussing ex-
pansion of civil right to counsel laws in Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Montana, Texas, 
Hawaii, Montana, Florida, and New York). 
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parties.89  Arkansas, Montana, and Texas expanded the right to coun-
sel to parents in the early stages of dependency proceedings.90  Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Montana all took measures to im-
prove the quality of representation to parents in dependency cases.91  
Florida passed a statute requiring the state to provide an attorney to 
file a petition to adjust the immigration status of eligible children.92  
Finally, New York now provides counsel as a matter of right to parents 
involved in child custody proceedings pending in both family court 
and in New York trial courts of general jurisdiction.93  Although these 
laws are limited, they demonstrate a willingness on the part of states 
to provide counsel as of right in certain situations, particularly in fam-
ily law matters. 
2.  Judicial Gains 
Litigation around the country has also been successful at expand-
ing the right to counsel.94  The California Court of Appeals found a 
right to counsel for non-custodial parents in contested adoption pro-
ceedings in 1983.95  The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected Lassiter’s 
case-by-case approach in 1991 and instead extended a bright line 
right to counsel to indigent parents in termination proceedings.96  
That court found that a case-by-case approach is unfair, time consum-
ing, and burdensome for the trial court.97 
 
 89 See ALA. CODE § 12-15-305 (2008) (expanding the right to counsel to parents in depen-
dency proceedings); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1245.1 (2008). 
 90 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401(d) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-425 (2007); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. §§ 107.013, 107.015 (2007). 
 91 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401(d) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-123c (2008); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 571-87 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-104, 47-1-202 (2007). 
 92 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(5) (2005). 
 93 N.Y. JUD. L. 35(8) (Consol. 2009). 
 94 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Pursuing Access to Justice and Civil Right to Counsel in a Time of Eco-
nomic Crisis, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 472, 490–91 (2010) (discussing various civil 
right to counsel suits). 
 95 See Jay v. Scott, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 (Ct. App. 1983) (“[D]ue process requires ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent noncustodial parents accused of neglect in stepparent 
adoption proceedings, if indigency is demonstrated and appointment of counsel is re-
quested.”). 
 96 See In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (“[W]e reject the case-by-case ap-
proach set out by the Supreme Court in Lassiter.  Rather, our view comports more with 
the dissent. . . . [T]he due process balancing in the abstract favors a bright line rule 
where ‘the private interest [is] weighty, the procedure devised by the state fraught with 
risks of error, and the countervailing governmental interest insubstantial.’  Moreover, we 
agree with Justice Blackmun’s explanation of the benefits of ‘procedural norms,’ and his 
caution about reviewability of case-by-case decision making.”) (citations omitted) (third 
alteration in original). 
 97 Id. 
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A federal district court in Georgia ruled that the Georgia state 
constitution and a state statute mandate the right to counsel for 
children involved in dependency proceedings involving a charge of 
abuse or neglect.98  In 2007, the Seventh Circuit overturned a narrow 
interpretation of access to pro bono counsel by prisoners.99  The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court extended the right to counsel in 2008 to 
parents at the initial phase of Child in Need of Services proceedings 
brought by the state whenever custody of the child could be removed 
from the parent.100  A Texas case, Rhine v. Deaton, petitioned the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court for certiorari to determine whether Texas 
denied equal protection by providing counsel in state-initiated termi-
nation proceedings, but not proceedings initiated by private parties.101  
The Court showed interest in the case by taking the unusual step of 
inviting the Texas Attorney General to submit a brief,102 but it even-
tually denied certiorari.103 
 
 98 See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359–61 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (de-
termining that after applying the Mathews balancing test, “it is in the state’s interest, as 
well as the child’s, to require the appointment of a child advocate attorney”). 
 99 See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the district 
court abused its discretion when it failed to make an initial determination that the pris-
oner was competent to litigate his claims); see also Engler, supra note 95, at 490–91  
(“Judge Korcoras noted at the Access to Justice Symposium the important en banc deci-
sion by the Seventh Circuit that overturned a narrow interpretation of a prisoner’s access 
to pro bono counsel in a proceeding alleging that he was sexually assaulted by a prison 
guard.”). 
100 See In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 352 (Mass. 2008); see also Engler, supra note 95, at 491 
(“The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court extended the right to counsel to parents at 
the dispositional phase of a CHINS (children in need of services) proceeding if the judge 
is considering awarding custody to the Department of Social Services.”). 
101 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2010) (No. 08-
1596). 
102 Although Rhine was a setback, the denial of certiorari should not be seen as instructive as 
to the Court’s views on right to counsel in termination proceedings.  The case was not a 
promising “civil Gideon” because lower courts did not have the chance to pass upon the 
federal issues.  The Texas Attorney General urged the Court not to grant certiorari be-
cause of this reason and also argued that the petitioner’s claims were insubstantial.  Brief 
for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 6, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010) (No. 
08-1596) (“Petitioner presents two questions of federal law.  By her own admission, how-
ever, neither was pressed in state court . . . . This Court’s longstanding rule . . . has been 
to refuse to upset state-court judgments on federal grounds never raised or resolved be-
low.  Because petitioner has no basis for departing from this traditional rule or its con-
trolling rationale, her petition should be denied.”); see also Steven D. Schwinn, ABA Presi-
dent Calls for Civil Gideon, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/week43/index.html (“Earlier this 
month, in a highly unusual move, the Court asked the Texas Solicitor General for views at 
the cert. stage on Rhine v. Deaton.”). 
103 See Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010). 
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IV.  WHY DO WE NEED A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL? 
Recent expansions of the civil right to counsel have created a siza-
ble foundation from which to expand the right around the country, 
but low income families and poor individuals are still consistently de-
nied vital civil legal services.  These unrepresented litigants are less 
likely to obtain a fair outcome in court than those who have counsel, 
and legal services organizations can serve only a fraction of litigants 
who need legal services.104  Even a narrow Supreme Court ruling on 
the issue would open the door to a more expansive right to counsel 
throughout the United States.  Many of the factors that informed the 
Gideon decision are in place today for the civil right to counsel, and 
the time is right for the Court to issue a decision on this matter.  The 
right to counsel is essential to a just legal system and, despite the pos-
sibility of high costs and administrative burdens, is too important to 
deny. 
A.  Legal Representation Makes a Difference 
The need for a civil right to counsel is not simply an honorable vi-
sion of liberal lawyers—legal representation makes a major difference 
in whether a party wins or loses a case.105  As the Court recognized in 
Gideon, the average citizen is ill-equipped to defend him-or herself in 
most complex adversarial proceedings.106  The ABA has declared that 
“when litigants cannot effectively navigate the legal system, they are 
denied access to fair and impartial dispute resolution, the adversarial 
 
104 See Rhode, supra note 57, at 869 (“Litigants who remain unrepresented are less likely to 
obtain a fair outcome in court.”); see also Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to 
Counsel, supra note 74 (citing two studies finding that 70% to 90% of poor people’s legal 
needs are not met). 
105 See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:  Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ 
Voices in the Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 539–40 (1992) (analyzing Baltimore’s 
rent court and finding that “each of the enumerable constraints impeding poor tenants’ 
court access is a substantial barrier to the assertion of claims by an appreciable numbers 
of tenants”); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City’s Housing Court:  Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 
420 (2001) (“[L]ow-income tenants with legal representation experience significantly 
more beneficial outcomes than their counterparts who do not have legal representation, 
independent of the merits of the case.”).  See generally ABA, supra note 56, at 517–18 
(2006) (“Not surprisingly, studies consistently show that legal representation makes a ma-
jor difference in whether a party wins in cases decided in the courts.”). 
106 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1962) (“[A]ny person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him. . . . Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law.”(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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process itself breaks down[,] and the courts cannot properly perform 
their role of delivering a just result.”107 
Yet, in the United States, access to wealth is still a great determi-
nate of access to legal services,108 and the reality is that low income 
persons have the greatest need for civil legal services.109  Low income 
individuals may face eviction, foreclosure, predatory lending, and 
consumer debt without the aid of an attorney to navigate the legal 
system.110  A person who is unjustly denied eligibility for government 
benefits is denied a form of livelihood with no guarantee of an attor-
ney to aid her.111  Still, the vast majority of poor people do not obtain 
legal help for these serious problems;112 fewer than 20% of low in-
come litigants will obtain the legal services they need.113 
Many civil cases involve complicated issues that pro se parties can-
not easily handle without help.114  Parties without lawyers are much 
more likely to lose their case because of procedural errors.115  For ex-
 
107 See ABA, supra note 56, at 518. 
108 See Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1059 (“[A]ccess to legal representation in civil cases in the 
United States continues to turn largely on the random and irrational calculus of 
wealth.”). 
109 See Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 74, at 2, 11, 15–17, 
19–20, 23–24; Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (finding that low income families have a 
civil legal problem about once a year on average); see also Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
Representation to Civil Gideon:  What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 39 (2010) (reviewing current studies on the impact of repre-
sentation in civil cases). 
110 See Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (“The fact is, being poor is terribly expensive.”). 
111 See Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1058 (“Whether a person is facing homelessness from fo-
reclosure or eviction, is wrongfully denied eligibility for Supplemental Security Income 
benefits, is erroneously denied coverage under the federal Medicaid statute for a life-
sustaining medical treatment or medication, is arbitrarily denied unemployment benefits, 
or is faced with an abusive consumer-collection suit, access to legal representation in civil 
cases in the United States continues to turn largely on the random and irrational calculus 
of wealth.”). 
112 See, e.g., Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 74, at 4 (citing 
two studies finding that 70% to 90% of poor people’s legal needs are not met); see also 
Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (citing studies showing “nationally, on average, low in-
come families had civil legal problems about once a year,” and that 70% of indigent liti-
gants do not obtain legal help for serious legal problems). 
113 Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America:  The Current Unmet Civil Legal 
Needs of Low Income Americans 13, 18 (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf (“The re-
cent state legal needs studies confirm earlier research and reveal that conservatively less 
than one in five—20 percent—of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive 
it.”); see also Henderson, supra note 56, at 78. 
114 See, e.g., Michelle Lore, The Push for Civil ‘Gideon’ Gaining Ground, MINNLAWYER.COM 
(Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.dakotalegal.org/Documents/MinnesotaLawyerPushfor
CivilGideon.pdf. 
115 Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“Parties without lawyers are far more likely to fall prey to 
procedure.”); Seron et al., supra note 106, at 429 (“The findings from this experiment 
clearly show that when low-income tenants in New York City’s Housing Court are pro-
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ample, litigants who are unrepresented in housing court are much 
more likely to default on their claims.116  In contested proceedings, 
lawyers use more of the procedural mechanisms, such as filing mo-
tions and requesting discovery, that are the key to success in many 
cases.117  The chances of a litigant prevailing against a represented 
party drop by about half when the litigant is pro se.118  Perhaps most 
importantly, litigants need an attorney’s knowledge and ability to 
raise the substantive claims and defenses that can win their cases.119  
For example, 83% of applications for domestic violence protection 
orders filed by a lawyer are granted, while only 32% of applicants who 
file their own orders succeed.120 
Lawyers acknowledge this problem and have released numerous 
resolutions, studies, and scholarly articles arguing the issue.121  
Though their statements could arguably be colored by professional 
self interest, judges who preside over civil proceedings also acknowl-
edge this reality.  A judge who served on the California Court of Ap-
peals observed that the countless cases he reviewed where a pro se 
party argued against a lawyer left him with serious doubts as to 
 
vided with legal counsel, they experience significantly more beneficial procedural out-
comes than their pro se counterparts.”). 
116 Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“[U]nrepresented parties have much higher rates of de-
fault.”); Seron et al., supra note 106, at 427 (“Notably, while approximately 28% of the 
control cases [without counsel] show defaults or failure to appear in Housing Court, only 
about 16% of treatments [with counsel] do so.”); Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for 
Poor Tenants:  Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 414, Tab. 18 
(1995) (“[L]egal services tenants were far less likely to default on the terms of their set-
tlement agreements—for example, by failing to make required use and occupancy pay-
ments or by failing to vacate on time—than unrepresented tenants.  Only twelve percent 
of the legal services tenants who related settlement agreements with their landlords de-
faulted, while thirty-four percent of the unrepresented tenants defaulted.”). 
117 Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“During contested proceedings, parties with lawyers make 
much greater use of procedural mechanisms that are key to success in civil litigation than 
do parties without.  Those with lawyers are, for example, more likely than those without 
to file motions (73% compared to 8%), request discovery (62% compared to 0%), and 
receive continuances (35% compared to 3%).” (citation omitted)). 
118 Id. at 71–72 (“A party who is unrepresented but faces a lawyer on the other side is at a 
significant disadvantage.  Her chances of prevailing drop by approximately half.” (citation 
omitted)). 
119 Id. at 72 (“Perhaps obviously, lawyers’ knowledge of and ability to raise substantive claims 
and defenses has also been found substantially to improve outcomes for their clients. . . . 
[R]aising substantive claims and defenses . . . greatly increases represented litigants’ 
chances of achieving outcomes that reflect the underlying merits of their cases.”). 
120 Id. (“Applicants for domestic violence protection orders with lawyers succeed 83% of the 
time, while only 32% of applicants without lawyers obtain such orders.”).  This statistic 
may be skewed by the fact that civil attorneys can pick and choose clients, and they may 
only choose to represent those litigants with the most promising cases. 
121 See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of legal opinion on the topic). 
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whether pro se litigants obtain fair hearings.122  This is true even de-
spite the fact that courts hold pro se filings to less stringent standards 
than attorney filings.123  Many of these pro se litigants need the assis-
tance of an attorney in order to obtain the fair hearing that is their 
constitutional right,124 but our current system leaves them to fend for 
themselves. 
B.  The Role of the United States Supreme Court:  The Need for a “Civil 
Gideon” 
Although advocacy for the civil right to counsel has experienced 
incremental gains, if the Supreme Court held that the right to coun-
sel is constitutionally guaranteed in even one civil situation, the legal 
scenery would immediately change.125  Litigation provides advocates 
with a unique possibility to ensure the right nationally.126  A single 
“civil Gideon” could speed up years of state-by-state legislative reforms 
and ensure that every state provides a right to counsel in certain civil 
cases.127 
A Supreme Court ruling would officially recognize what the Court 
has been hinting at since its decision in Gideon, that the right to 
counsel is a fundamental right beyond criminal proceedings.128  Even 
a narrow decision would open the door to further claims to create a 
more expansive right, as did Gideon.  Although Lassiter creates an ob-
 
122 See Earl Johnson, “And Justice for All”:  When Will the Pledge Be Fulfilled?, 47 JUDGES’ J. 5 
(2008) (“I can’t count the number of cases I reviewed as an appellate judge in which a 
pro se party went mano a mano against a skilled or even a neophyte lawyer and left me 
with serious doubts about whether the pro se party got a fair hearing or whether the trial 
court made the right decision.  The trial judges in those cases would have had to have felt 
equally uncomfortable about the distinct possibility that they were delivering injustice, ra-
ther than justice, in those cases.”). 
123 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (observing that the Court holds pro se 
complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). 
124 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
125 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (“[A] singular holding by the Supreme Court identify-
ing a right to appointed counsel in civil matters in the United States Constitution would 
change the landscape in an instant.  The question in the states would turn from ‘why’ to 
‘how,’ as implementation of the right would be the order of the day.”); see also Sargent 
Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010); supra Part III.C (out-
lining recent legislative and judicial gains). 
126 See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (observing that once the Court passes a civil Gideon, 
“[t]he question in the states would turn from ‘why’ to ‘how,’ as implementation of the 
right would be the order of the day”). 
127 Id.  
128 See id. (“[A] singular holding by the Supreme Court identifying a right to appointed 
counsel in civil matters in the United States Constitution would change the landscape in 
an instant.”). 
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stacle for the civil right to counsel movement, Gideon and recent 
Court decisions serve as a reminder that the doctrine of stare decisis is 
not absolute.129  When the Court is faced with a decision or constitu-
tional axiom that no longer stands “in light of its full development 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation,”130 the 
doctrine will yield.131 
Looking to Gideon for inspiration, it is now appropriate for the 
Court to reconsider Lassiter.  Scholars have noted that conditions that 
contributed to the reversal of Betts v. Brady132 in Gideon are now 
present on the civil side.133  Previous litigation concerning a right of-
ten paves the way for so-called “landmark” decisions.134  The civil right 
to counsel has been frequently litigated in both state and federal 
courts.135  Anthony Lewis has suggested that pervasive academic dis-
 
129 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010) (“[T]he relevant factors in de-
ciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the 
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well rea-
soned.”(internal quotation marks omitted)); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082, 
2088, 2090–91 (2009) (“We do not think that stare decisis requires us to expand signifi-
cantly the holding of a prior decision—fundamentally revising its theoretical basis in the 
process—in order to cure its practical deficiencies.”); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 
816–18 (2009) (“Although [the U.S. Supreme Court] approache[s] the reconsideration 
of our decisions . . . with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hornstein, supra note 54, 
at n.301 (noting that several recent Court decisions have not followed stare decisis). 
130 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
131 Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1107–08 (“The Court’s willingness in Gideon to revisit and 
overrule its prior decision in Betts [v. Brady] reminds us that the doctrine of stare deci-
sis . . . will yield when confronted with a poorly reasoned decision or a dated constitution-
al axiom that, when considered ‘in the light of its full development and its present place 
in American life,’ no longer enjoys the continued currency of truth or constitutional va-
lidity.” (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 492)). 
132 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942) (denying a right to counsel to indigent defendants prosecuted 
by the state). 
133 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 6, at 531–32 (“Some of the conditions that contributed to the 
reversal of Betts are already in place on the civil side.”). 
134 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (holding that defendant Johnson had 
a right to counsel at his federal trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (finding 
that the Scottsboro boys did not receive effective assistance of counsel).  These cases pre-
ceded Gideon by nearly thirty years.  Many education cases also preceded Brown.  See 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–36 (1950) (holding that plaintiff Sweatt must be al-
lowed to attend University of Texas Law School because the historically black law school 
was not equal in prestige or quality); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 
631, 632-33 (1948) (holding that the state must provide the black petitioner with “secure 
legal education afforded by a state institution”). 
135 See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing civil right to counsel litigation); Termination of Parent-
Child Relationship of I.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270–71 (Ind. 
2010) (holding that parents in termination proceedings have a right to counsel on ap-
peal); In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ohio 2010) (finding a right to counsel for juve-
nile defendants in civil protection order proceeding); In re E.H., 243 P.3d 160, 164–65 
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approval of Betts may have contributed to the Court’s choice to over-
rule that decision.136  Lassiter is similarly criticized by legal scholars, at-
torneys, and judges.137  Deborah Rhode, a leading legal ethics and 
public policy scholar, writes that Lassiter undercuts the “legitimacy of 
the justice system” because it fails to guarantee representation even in 
cases “where crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are impre-
cise and subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and re-
sources between the parties are grossly imbalanced.”138  The Honora-
ble Robert W. Sweet wrote pointedly in 1998 that “[t]he time has 
come to reverse Lassiter and provide counsel in civil litigation just as 
the Supreme Court in Gideon in 1963 reversed its holding in Betts v. 
Brady twenty-one years earlier and found for a right to counsel in all 
criminal proceedings.”139 
Yet there are downsides to pursuing the right to counsel through 
litigation.  Litigation is inherently uncertain.  The Supreme Court 
grants certiorari in fewer than 1% of the cases appealed to the Court, 
so there is no guarantee that the Court would ever agree to consider 
a potential “civil Gideon.”140  If the Court does grant certiorari and the 
case fails, the Court could deny the right to counsel in an even 
stronger opinion than Lassiter.  Nevertheless, there is little to lose in 
this area and much to gain.  If the Court denies that this is a funda-
mental right, advocates will not be foreclosed from pursuing the 
rights through other means.  State courts can still find that the civil 
right to counsel is a fundamental right under state constitutions, and 
 
(Wash. 2010) (holding that parents had statutory right to appointed attorney in nonpa-
rental custody action); see also Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel, Litigation, 
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/advances/litigation/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (dis-
cussing the I.B. case). 
136 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 117–18 (1964) (noting that scholarly criticism of 
Betts may have influenced the Gideon Court); see also Abel, supra note 71, at 531 (2006) 
(“[W]idespread academic condemnation for the Court’s ruling in Betts may have been 
among the factors leading to that decision’s demise.”). 
137 See Abel, supra note 71, at 531 (noting that “[m]any highly respected academics and 
judges have . . . roundly condemned Lassiter”); Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, 
and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents:  The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 379–80 (2005) (citing 
several articles that criticize Lassiter). 
138 Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1799 (2001); see also Abel, 
supra note 71, at 531–32 (quoting Rhode). 
139 Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 
506 (1998). 
140 The Court receives over ten thousand petitions for certiorari each year, and grants about 
seventy-five to eighty of those petitions.  SUPREMECOURT.GOV, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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state legislators can continue to expand the right statutorily.141  But if 
the Court extends the right to counsel to even one civil situation, the 
door will be open for more expansions of the right. 
If the Court does reach a favorable decision, implementing that 
civil Gideon will face obstacles.142  Opponents of the right to counsel 
argue that the cost of providing the right would be too great, and 
line-drawing to determine which cases should receive counsel would 
be too difficult.143  It is true that even in a thriving economy, finding 
money to fund civil legal services has been a struggle.144  Line-drawing 
will also be an issue, as it was after Gideon,145 and some cases will likely 
end up before the Supreme Court.146 
But these logistical and financial concerns do not undercut the 
need for counsel.  All of these issues were equally important in Gide-
 
141 There is a danger that a decision by the Supreme Court denying this right could slow 
down gains in other arenas.  However, states are free to provide protections above and 
beyond those provided in the Constitution.  For example, some states choose to provide 
more expansive Fourth Amendment protections.  See, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 
353, 362 (Minn. 2004) (establishing the Supreme Court of Minnesota conclusion “that 
there was a principled basis for interpreting . . . [Minn. Const. art. I, § 10] as providing 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment” and declining to follow the Supreme 
Court, adhering instead to its “longstanding rule that a seizure occurs when a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s shoes would not feel free to leave, thereby maintaining the rea-
sonableness requirement in a wider range of circumstances”); State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 
175, 177 (Ohio 2003) (“[Ohio Constitution article I, § 14] provides greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment . . . against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.”).  
Further, the Lassiter decision did not prevent states and courts from taking the steps out-
lined supra Part III.C to provide a civil right to counsel in certain situations. 
142 Thomas Burke, A Civil Gideon?  Let the Debate Begin¸ 65 J. MO. B. 5, 5–6 (2009) (“Obvious-
ly, the idea of a civil Gideon . . . faces enormous challenges and hurdles, not the least of 
which include who should get counsel and in what types of cases, how much such a pro-
gram would cost, and a source of funding.”). 
143 Lore, supra note 115 (“The primary arguments against the right to counsel in civil cases 
are the cost and the difficulty in drawing a line as to which cases the right would apply.”). 
144 Audi, supra note 86 (“In 2006, the American Bar Association issued a statement backing 
civil Gideon.  But finding the money for it, even when the economy was booming, has 
been difficult.”). 
145 See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (“[A] suspended sentence that may 
end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty may not be imposed unless the de-
fendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution for the crime 
charged.”(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coleman v. Alabama, 
399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970) (holding that the defendant had a right to counsel at a prelimi-
nary hearing even if nothing at that hearing would be used in trial); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (finding a right to counsel at a pretrial line-up); see also 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that actual imprisonment, rather than 
fines or the threat of imprisonment, is requisite for a constitutional right to counsel). 
146 See Lore, supra note 115 (“[T]here will be some grey areas that will likely end up before 
the Supreme Court, but . . . that’s not a reason to avoid implementation of the civil right 
to counsel.”(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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on, but the Court still recognized the right to counsel.147  In Argersin-
ger, concurring opinions noted that expanding Gideon would be com-
plicated for states to implement, especially since they were already 
having difficulty providing effective counsel under Gideon, but the 
Court chose to extend the right to counsel notwithstanding these 
problems.148  In a civil context, the costs of not extending the right 
are of equal importance to those the Court recognized in Argersin-
ger.149  The lack of a right to counsel in situations where critical hu-
man needs are at stake undermines our legal system.150  The Supreme 
Court has recognized that the “right to sue and defend . . . is the 
right conservative of all other rights[,] . . . lies at the foundation of 
orderly government . . . [, and] is one of the highest and most essen-
tial privileges of citizenship.”151  Yet without a civil right to counsel, 
the reality is that the right to sue and defend is based in large part on 
wealth.152  America has the highest concentration of attorneys in the 
 
147 Abel, supra note 6, at 535–36 (“The fact that the Gideon Court was undaunted by [line-
drawing and financial] difficulties demonstrates that awareness of similar obstacles in the 
civil context need not doom a litigation initiative to establish a right to counsel in civil 
cases.”). 
148 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1971) (Burger, J., concurring) (“The holding of 
the Court today may well add large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but 
the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it.”); id. at 55 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“It is doubtful that the States possess the necessary resources to 
meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel.”); see also id. at 37 n.7 (observing “Jus-
tice Powell’s doubt that the Nation’s legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule 
we announce today,” but expecting that there would actually be enough lawyers); Abel, 
supra note 6, at 536–37 (“Notably, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the scope 
of the right to counsel in criminal cases, notwithstanding the Court’s clear recognition of 
the difficulties states have encountered in implementing Gideon.  In Argersinger v. Ham-
lin . . . [c]oncurring opinions discussed the high volume of cases that would be affected, 
noted that the states were already having difficulty providing competent counsel for all fe-
lony defendants, and predicted that the states would find implementing Argersinger even 
more difficult.  Nevertheless, the Court did not shy away from its duty to correctly interp-
ret the Constitution in the face of these difficulties.”). 
149 Burke, supra note 143, at 5–6 (“Though the costs and commitment would be significant, 
the greater cost, both individually and collectively, is in failing to provide counsel in cases 
involving housing, healthcare and child custody.”). 
150 Rhode, supra note 139 (“The rationale for subsidized representation seems particularly 
strong in cases like Lassiter, where crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are impre-
cise and subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and resources between the 
parties are grossly imbalanced.  Under such circumstances, opportunities for legal assis-
tance are crucial to the legitimacy of the justice system.”). 
151 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Rhode, supra note 139, 
at 1799 (“[The right to sue and defend] affirms interests of human dignity that are core 
democratic ideals.”). 
152 See supra Part IV.A (noting the role wealth plays in access to counsel); Hornstein, supra 
note 54, at 1065–72 (discussing wealth and lack of access to counsel). 
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world, but it still does not provide counsel in cases where litigants’ 
basic human needs are at stake.153  We can do better. 
V.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS:  A 
PROMISING CIVIL GIDEON FOR JUVENILES 
A promising situation to fulfill the hopes of a civil Gideon would be 
to argue Lassiter from the child’s perspective instead of the parent’s.  
The Lassiter Court did not consider whether due process would 
mandate that the state appoint counsel for William Lassiter, and all 
other children who are the subject of any type of termination, abuse 
and neglect, or dependency proceedings brought by the state.154  Just 
as was true before Gideon, a legal framework, however inadequate, is 
already in place to provide this right, and the due process arguments 
for the right are persuasive.155  A case in which a child was not 
represented by counsel and was erroneously removed from his or her 
family or returned to an abusive home would present serious due 
process issues that could convince the Court to extend a bright line 
right to counsel for children in termination proceedings. 
A.  Existing Right to Counsel in Juveniles Termination Proceedings 
A large number of right to counsel statutes already concern juve-
niles who are subject to some type of custody proceeding, such as 
abuse and neglect, dependency, or termination proceedings.  This is 
in part because the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
(“CAPTA”) requires that states receiving federal funds under the Act 
appoint a representative for juveniles involved in abuse or neglect 
 
153 Rhode, supra note 57, at 869 (“‘Equal justice under law’ is a principle widely embraced 
and routinely violated.  Although the United States has the world’s highest concentration 
of lawyers, it fails miserably at making their assistance accessible to those who need it 
most.”); see generally Terrence J. Brooks, New Concepts in Equal Access to Justice:  Recent State 
Developments Regarding Civil Right to Counsel, 47 JUDGES’ J. 28 (2008) (discussing imple-
mentation of the ABA resolution for civil right to counsel and where that right stands 
now). 
154 See generally Taylor, supra note 10 (noting that “[a]fter performing the [Mathews] balanc-
ing test, one must conclude that the enormity of the child’s interests involved in abuse 
and neglect proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation require the ap-
pointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hearing”); Smiles, 
supra note 10, at 487 (arguing that the Mathews balancing test weighs strongly in favor of 
appointing counsel to children at termination hearings). 
155 See supra Parts III–IV (discussing the current right to counsel in civil cases). 
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proceedings.156  Still, despite this nation-wide mandate for representa-
tion, the right to counsel varies from state to state.157 
All fifty states require some type of representation for children in 
termination proceedings.158  Thirty-four states and the District of Co-
lumbia mandate the appointment of a lawyer for juveniles in termina-
tion proceedings.159  Other states leave the appointment of counsel 
for juveniles to the discretion of the judge.160  The child is considered 
a party to all proceedings in thirty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia.161  A child has a right to counsel on appeal in twenty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia.162 
Although these statutes are widespread, they do not ensure that 
counsel will always be appointed in child custody proceedings, even 
in proceedings where a child may be permanently removed from his 
or her home.163  The right to counsel may or may not include repre-
 
156 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii); see also 
Laura K. Abel & Lora J. Livingston, The Existing Civil Right To Counsel Infrastructure, 47 
JUDGES’ J. 24, 25 (2008). 
157 There is no requirement under CAPTA that the child’s representative be an attorney, but 
many states chose to supplement the requirements of the Act with that protection.  Still, 
almost twenty states choose not to do so, leaving children in those states with fewer safe-
guards than children in the rest of the country.  See Frederick & Sams, supra note 84. 
158 See id.; see also Abel & Rettig, supra note 13 (outlining current right to counsel statutes for 
children in termination hearings and other civil right to counsel statutes). 
159 Frederick & Sams, supra note 84, at 12–13.  See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(f) 
(West 2010) (guaranteeing appointment of counsel for juveniles in state-initiated termi-
nation-of-parental-rights proceedings and guardianship proceedings for dependent 
children); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-98(a) (West 2009) (“In any proceeding for terminating 
parental rights . . . the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the child as the child’s 
counsel.”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-813 (West 2010) (providing a right to 
counsel in children-in-need-of-assistance proceedings for all parties who are younger than 
eighteen). 
160 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (2008) (“The court shall . . . appoint counsel for the child 
in termination cases where there is an adverse interest between parent and child or where 
the parent is . . . under the age of 18 years or counsel is otherwise required in the inter-
ests of justice.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-872(D) (2010) (“In a [termination] proceed-
ing for permanent guardianship. . . [t]he court may also appoint one for the child if a 
guardian ad litem has not already been appointed.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100 (2009) 
(“In any proceeding for terminating parental rights, or any rehearing or appeal thereon, 
the court may appoint an attorney to represent the child as his counsel.”); see also Abel & 
Rettig, supra note 13. 
161 Frederick & Sams, supra note 84. 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. supra note 161 (“In any proceeding for terminating parental 
rights, or any rehearing or appeal thereon, the court may appoint an attorney to 
represent the child as his counsel.”(emphasis added)); Meredith Larson, Child Custody, 
Visitation & Termination of Parental Rights, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 713, 747 (2009); see also 
Abel & Rettig, supra note 13; Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (noting that the 
“[p]atchwork recognition [of the civil right to counsel] and implementation by legisla-
tures form a fragile and uneven safety net”). 
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sentation during preliminary termination proceedings, even though 
these proceedings can effectively determine where a child will live.164  
Sixteen states still leave appointment of counsel at the discretion of 
the trial judge.165  In twelve states, a child is not even considered a 
party to the proceedings that will determine where he or she will 
live.166  The interests at stake in these proceedings are fundamental, 
so the right to appointed counsel should be guaranteed in all fifty 
states. 
B.  Children Have a Strong Procedural Due Process Interest in Appointed 
Counsel in Termination Proceedings 
When a termination proceeding begins, the state has already al-
leged that the child has experienced abuse, neglect or abandon-
ment.167  If the judge presiding over the proceeding makes an erro-
neous decision, the child could be returned to an abusive home and 
face injury or death, or be wrongly separated from her family.168  Be-
cause of the important matters at stake, procedural due process re-
quires that children have a right to counsel at termination proceed-
ings. 
Due process constrains any official governmental action which 
deprives an individual of “liberty” or “property” interests within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.169  Courts determine whether due process mandates 
 
164 Frederick & Sams, supra note 84. 
165 Id. at 12–13. 
166 Id. 
167 See Meridith Sopher, Giving the Children a Meaningful Voice:  The Role of the Child’s Lawyer in 
Child Protective, Permanency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 223 PRAC. LAW 
INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES CRIM. L. & URB. PROBS. 63, 65 (2010) (discussing ter-
mination proceedings).  See generally Taylor, supra note 10, at 606 (“By the time a child’s 
case enters the dependency court system, he is alleged to have experienced abuse, neg-
lect, or abandonment by a parent or caregiver on whom he should have been most able 
to rely.  He is removed from all that is familiar to him, including family, home, friends, 
and school.”). 
168 See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the child’s interests at stake in a termination proceeding). 
169 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes con-
straints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ in-
terests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”).  In dependency proceedings, a child has a liberty interest in not being forcibly 
separated from her family by the state.  The Supreme Court has not established whether 
due process protections apply to children who are subject to state-initiated termination 
proceedings, but the Court has established that procedural due process applies to juve-
niles in other situations.  See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that Gault 
had a right to counsel in a criminal proceeding in the juvenile courts); see also Smiles, su-
pra note 10, at 485–86 (“The Court has not established, however, whether similar due 
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the appointment of counsel on a case-by-case basis.170  Courts must 
balance three factors:  (1) the private interest affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and 
(3) the government’s interest.171  In termination proceedings, each of 
these factors weighs toward the appointment of counsel for juve-
niles.172 
1.  The Private Interests at Stake 
The private interests at stake in termination proceedings are po-
werful.  In these proceedings the state seeks to end the relationship 
between parent and child, and, if successful, the state “will have 
worked a unique kind of deprivation” of familial ties.173  The Court 
has “made plain beyond the need for multiple citation” that a par-
ent’s right to raise his or her own children is a commanding interest 
that indisputably warrants protection.174  Yet the child’s interests at 
stake in termination proceedings are even greater than the parent’s 
because of the child’s distinctive position as dependant and juve-
nile.175 
 
process protections attach in juvenile dependency proceedings when a state brings an ac-
tion to protect a child from abuse or neglect, even though dependency courts often de-
cide where and with whom a child will reside.”).  Lower federal courts have determined 
that children have a liberty interest at stake in termination proceedings and are, there-
fore, given due process protections.  See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (“This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal 
rights of both parent and children.  It is the interest of the parent in the ‘companionship, 
care, custody and management of his or her children,’ and of the children in not being 
dislocated from the ‘emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associa-
tion’ with the parent.” (citations omitted)); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 
235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the liberty “interest in not being forcibly separated by 
the state is shared by parents and children”). 
170 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (“We . . . leave the decision 
whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termi-
nation proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of 
course, to appellate review.”). 
171 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 
172 For alternative applications of the Mathews test to juveniles in termination, dependency, 
and abuse and neglect proceedings, see generally Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional 
Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663 (2006); Taylor, 
supra note 10; Smiles, supra note 10. 
173 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
174 Id. 
175 See Pitchal, supra note 173, at 676 (“Children have a greater liberty interest at 
stake . . . than their parents . . . because the risk of harm they face is irreparable.”); 
Smiles, supra note 10, at 495 (noting that, in termination hearings, “the interest of the 
child is even greater than that of a parent”). 
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During termination proceedings, a judge makes vital decisions 
about a child’s future, decisions that can affect the rest of a child’s 
life.  These include where a child will be placed if removed from his 
or her home, permanency of that placement, and visitation rights of 
parents and relatives.176  The child has a strong interest in either be-
ing removed from an abusive environment or, if the home environ-
ment is not abusive, in retaining ties with his or her family.177  A child 
who is returned to an abusive environment can suffer extreme conse-
quences, including long-term disabilities, such as mental retardation 
or physical handicap, or even death.178  A child who is erroneously 
removed from his or her home will not only lose ties with his or her 
family but will also face the “well-known risks of long-term foster care:  
[P]oor educational progress, poor health, deteriorating health, dete-
riorating mental health, and, ultimately as young adults, unemploy-
ment, homelessness, and disconnection from society.”179  A child has a 
powerful interest in his or her own future, health, safety, well-being, 
and the companionship and care of his or her biological or adoptive 
parents.180 
2.  The Risk of Erroneous Decision Without Safeguards 
The risk of an incorrect decision without additional safeguards is 
insupportably high in termination proceedings.  An erroneous deci-
sion that a child should not be removed from his or her home can 
have a destructive effect on a child leading to abuse, neglect, or even 
death.181  An erroneous judgment that a child should be removed 
 
176 Taylor, supra note 10 (discussing the possible outcome of court hearings while a child is 
in the termination system). 
177 See Smiles, supra note 10, at 496 (“[T]he child may . . . have a strong interest in being re-
moved from his home because . . . the child’s safety may be at risk.”). 
178 See, e.g., id.; Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
179 Pitchal, supra note 173, at 664. 
180 See Smiles, supra note 10, at 495 n.59 (declaring that a child has an interest in the compa-
nionship and care of his parents); see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 607 (observing that a 
child’s liberty interests include “safety, health, and well-being, as well as an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship with biological 
parents”). 
181 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“On the one 
hand, an erroneous decision  . . . that parental rights should not be terminated can have 
a devastating effect on a child, leading to chronic abuse or even death.  On the other 
hand, an erroneous decision that a child is deprived or that parental rights should be 
terminated can lead to the unnecessary destruction of the child’s most important family 
relationships.”). 
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from his or her home can lead to unnecessary isolation and destruc-
tion of a child’s familial relationships.182 
The risks of an erroneous decision are compounded by the pro-
cedures used in termination proceedings.  The Unites States Su-
preme Court has acknowledged the high likelihood of risk associated 
with these procedures in the past.  In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court 
held that due process mandates that a state prove neglect or abuse 
allegations using clear and convincing evidence because in termina-
tion proceedings: 
[N]umerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfind-
ing . . . . [Termination] proceedings employ imprecise substantive stan-
dards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of 
the judge . . . . [T]he court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh 
probative facts that might favor the parent.  Because parents subject to 
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of mi-
nority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based 
on cultural or class bias.183 
Because of this high risk, the additional safeguard of guaranteed 
counsel is invaluable.  The presence of counsel to represent the in-
terests of the child can help to check the discretion given to judges in 
these proceedings, to ensure that bias against indigent families does 
not play a part in the court’s decision, and to ensure that the child’s 
voice is heard.184 
Guaranteed counsel is uniquely important for children at termi-
nation hearings because of their position as juveniles in a courtroom.  
Compared with adults, most children lack maturity and are vulnera-
ble to outside pressures.185  These differences mean that a child may 
feel uncomfortable and fearful in a courtroom and may be unwilling 
to speak up in front of their parents or a judge.  A parent, or a par-
ent’s attorney, cannot be assumed to speak for the child because the 
parent may have different interests than the child—it may be in a 
 
182 Id. 
183 455 U.S. 745, 762–63 (1982) (citations omitted). 
184 Id. (noting that parental termination proceedings are susceptible to judgments based on 
class bias).  Even if an attorney’s presence cannot compel a judge to make a decision 
without bias, the attorney may serve as an additional witness to that bias in an appeal of a 
court’s decision, similarly to the position of an attorney who is present at a flawed crimi-
nal line-up. 
185 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“Three general differences between 
juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability 
be classified among the worst offenders.  First, . . . [a] lack of maturity and an underdeve-
loped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young . . . . [S]econd . . . juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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parent’s interest to lie to the court in order to keep the child despite 
abusive or neglectful conditions in the home.  The child’s voice is 
therefore crucial for allowing a judge to make an informed deci-
sion,186 and in a courtroom, attorneys typically control what informa-
tion reaches the judge.187  The presence of an attorney to represent 
the child will thus help to guarantee that the judge receives necessary 
information about the child’s home situation and expressed inter-
ests.188  The risk of erroneous decisions is high, and children need 
additional procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the outcome 
of any termination proceeding is both correct and fair. 
3.  The Government’s Interest 
A bright line rule for appointed counsel in termination proceed-
ings will also protect government interests.  Government interests in-
clude “the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.”189  In termination proceedings, the two primary interests of 
the state are a “parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the 
welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reduc-
ing the cost and burden of such proceedings.”190  The right to counsel 
for juveniles in termination proceedings will safeguard both of these 
interests. 
The state’s parens patriae interest is only at issue when a child is be-
ing abused or neglected; the state has no interest in intervening oth-
erwise.191  The state’s parens patriae interest is therefore “best pro-
moted by procedures that enhance the court’s fact-finding ability, 
enabling courts to reach a result most in line with the best interests of 
 
186 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“The absence of the child’s voice means that the court 
does not have all relevant information to make the best decision.”). 
187 See Implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hu-
man Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 63 (2003) (statement of Mark 
Hardin, Dir., Nat’l Child Welfare Res. Ctr. on Legal & Judicial Issues, Am. Bar Ass’n (“At-
torneys largely control the flow of information to the judge. Attorneys decide what wit-
nesses, evidence, and arguments to present. . . . Without complete relevant information, 
judges’ decisions may well be ill informed or even tragically mistaken.”). 
188 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“Without attorneys to advocate for the child’s expressed 
interests and present information that would not otherwise be offered, there is a high risk 
that children will be placed in foster care unnecessarily or will remain in the system long-
er than required to ensure their safety.  In the alternative, it is also possible that, when the 
child’s views and wishes are ignored, he will be returned to an abusive environment.”). 
189 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
190 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
191 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“The state has no interest in intervening in the family 
when there is not proper justification supported by evidence.”). 
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the child.”192  Counsel for a child involved in a termination proceed-
ing will aid the court in correct and speedy fact-finding because at-
torneys know the rules and procedures of the court and can commu-
nicate directly with the child and his or her parent(s).193  A judge can 
only perform a limited fact-finding investigation from the bench.  
Counsel can complete a more in-depth investigation into a child’s 
home life, can converse directly with a child in a less formal environ-
ment than a courtroom, and can communicate relevant information 
to a judge in an easily understandable and unbiased manner. 
A bright line rule to appoint counsel should lower the state’s ad-
ministrative burden because bright line rules are generally less com-
plicated to administer than case-by-case determinations.  In an ami-
cus brief to the Gideon Court, twenty-three states urged the Court to 
adopt a bright line rule for right to counsel, noting that a categorical 
right is more even-handed and easier to administer.194  The Supreme 
Court of Alaska rejected Lassiter’s case-by-case framework because 
“the case-by-case approach adopted by the [Court in Lassiter] does 
not lend itself practically to judicial review . . . . [It is] also time con-
suming and burdensome on the trial court.”195  A categorical right to 
counsel for children in termination proceedings will save courts the 
considerable effort involved in balancing the Mathews factors and 
dealing with appeals for cases where children were not afforded 
counsel, while also aiding judicial fact-finding. 
Finally, the state’s fiscal interests are unlikely to be severely 
harmed by a constitutional guarantee of appointed counsel for juve-
niles.  Many states already guarantee this right, which will lower the 
 
192 Smiles, supra note 10, at 498. 
193 Taylor, supra note 10, at 608. 
194 Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, at 3 (1963) (No. 155) (“The rule of Betts v. Brady does not make it 
possible to conduct a trial fairly within the meaning of the advocacy system.  For that sys-
tem, depending as it does on presentation of all considerations on both sides of the case, 
demands the presence of counsel . . . .  Consequently, the rule has been, and is being, in-
consistently and confusingly applied, and the appellate decisions are contradictory and 
almost invariably marked with sharp dissents.”).  Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, 
and West Virginia filed an amicus brief urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady.  Id.; see also 
Gardner, supra note 56, at 74 (“As the [twenty-three] amic[i] states told the Court in 
Gideon, a categorical right is far easier to administer, and to administer fairly.”). 
195 In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Note, Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services:  A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 
261, 282–83 (1982)). 
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overall financial cost of providing counsel.196  And a bright line rule 
for counsel may save states money.  Studies conducted since Gideon 
have documented that civil cases reach more cost-effective outcomes 
when litigants are represented by attorneys.197  Recent expansions of 
the right to counsel seem to have been based on the belief that pro-
viding counsel would both decrease the number of children removed 
from their homes and speed the return of children to their families, 
thereby saving the government money.198  Many states have expanded 
the right to counsel even in times of financial strain, suggesting that 
legislators anticipated financial savings.199  But even if the state’s fiscal 
interests are harmed, the Court has observed that “though the State’s 
pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to 
overcome private interests as important as those [of indigent parents 
in termination proceedings].”200 
 
196 See supra Part V.A (discussing the current right to counsel in this area).  All fifty states re-
quire some type of representation for children in termination hearings, although those 
rights can vary widely.  See Frederick & Sams, supra note 84.  The fact that so many states 
already guarantee the right also suggests that doing so has not been fiscally impossible 
and should not be unattainable for most states.  See generally Abel & Rettig, supra note 13 
(outlining current right to counsel statutes for children in termination hearings and oth-
er civil right to counsel statutes). 
197 Carol J. Williams, California Gives the Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at 
A8 (“Over the four-plus decades since the Gideon ruling, legal researchers have docu-
mented that when litigants have lawyers in civil cases, more just and cost-effective out-
comes are reached.”); (Penny) Wise Justice for California, supra note 87 (noting that the Sar-
gent Shriver Act will not add to California’s fiscal woes).  But see D. James Greiner & 
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, What Difference Representation?  (Working Paper, Nov. 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (reporting that a series of studies showed 
that representation in unemployment benefits cases inflicted harm on litigants and did 
not increase probability of a favorable outcome). 
198 Abel, supra note 89, at 1110 (“The Arkansas, Montana, and Texas expansions of the right 
to counsel for parents in dependency cases apparently were premised on a belief that 
providing parents with counsel would decrease the number of children taken from their 
parents and speed the return of children to their parents, thus benefiting individual 
children and saving the government money.”). 
199 Id. at 1111 (“Expectations of financial savings may explain why the civil right to counsel 
has been expanded in states with tight budgets, and even in states that have had to in-
crease their spending on other kinds of mandated representation . . . . Arkansas ex-
panded its right to counsel for parents in dependency cases at a time when tax revenues 
were $23 million lower than had been anticipated.  Similarly, Montana expanded its right 
to counsel for parents in abuse and neglect cases at the same time it set up a potentially 
expensive statewide public defender system in response to an ACLU lawsuit . . . .  Finally, 
Texas expanded the right to counsel for parents in abuse and neglect cases four years af-
ter it revamped its county-funded indigent defense system to provide, for the first time, 
some state funding for appointed counsel in criminal cases.”). 
200 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). 
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4.  Fundamental Fairness 
Combined, the Mathews factors powerfully weigh toward appoint-
ment of counsel, and the basic tenet of due process—fundamental 
fairness—also commands that children have a right to counsel in 
termination proceedings.  The Court has long held that due process 
is a malleable concept that changes with time.  In Lassiter, the Court 
recognized that “[u]nlike some legal rules . . . due process is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, 
and circumstances.  Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of 
fundamental fairness, a requirement whose meaning can 
be . . . opaque.”201 
In determining what is “fundamentally fair,” the Court has consi-
dered the number of states that guarantee a right.  For example, in 
Powell v. Alabama, Justice Sutherland noted that every state provided 
some type of right to counsel in capital cases, and stated that, “[a] 
rule adopted with such . . . accord reflects, if it does not establish, the 
inherent right to have counsel appointed . . . and lends convincing 
support to the conclusion” that counsel is constitutionally required.202  
Currently, upwards of thirty-four states guarantee the right to counsel 
to children in terminations proceedings, almost exactly the same 
number of states that provided a right to counsel in criminal cases be-
fore Gideon.203  The Court itself recognized almost twenty years ago 
that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent 
parent is entitled to assistance of appointed counsel,” and states have 
come to the same conclusion for children.204  The combination of this 
fact with the balance of the Mathews factors demonstrates that juve-
niles in termination proceedings should be afforded counsel as of 
right. 
 
201 Id. at 24–25 (internal quotations omitted). 
202 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).  For example, the Court has adjusted its con-
cept of due process to accord with evolving due process standards in the context of cruel 
and unusual punishment.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding that 
executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment because it is cruel and unusual); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating state laws that allow execution of 
defendants with mental retardations because those laws violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment). 
203 See Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, at 2, 10 (1963) (No. 155) (“[T]hirty-five states now require the 
appointment of counsel in non-capital cases . . . . Such a solid majority of the states, in 
endorsement of the non-capital assigned counsel principle, indicates that the principle is 
indeed a fundamental part of the concept of due process of law.”). 
204 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33–34. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The time is right for a civil Gideon, and the call for the civil right to 
counsel is mounting across the United States.  Attorneys and legisla-
tures have begun to address the necessity for the right through litiga-
tion, legislation, and advocacy groups.205  And the need for counsel is 
greater than ever—low income families are facing eviction, foreclo-
sure, predatory lending, and consumer debt without the aid of an at-
torney.206  Still, fewer than twenty percent of low income litigants get 
the legal services they need.207 
The right to counsel is fundamentally important to our legal sys-
tem, but it is not universally guaranteed.  State legislatures have be-
gun to recognize the problem, but their efforts are not enough.  Test 
case litigation is one promising route to finally guarantee this right 
on a nation-wide basis.  The case of a child who was denied counsel at 
a termination proceeding presents serious due process issues that 
could at long last provide the Court with a civil Gideon.   
Children involved in termination proceedings have such powerful 
interests at stake that due process mandates additional procedures to 
protect them—namely, appointed counsel.  Although a holding that 
children are guaranteed counsel in termination proceedings will not 
grant as sweeping a right to civil counsel as Gideon did for criminal 
counsel, that holding would protect an important and fundamental 
right—the right to a fair hearing when commanding interests are at 
risk—and would open the door to further civil right to counsel 
claims.  The civil right to counsel is essential to a fair legal system, 
and it is time for the Court to address this reality and extend the right 
to certain civil situations. 
 
 
205 See Pastore, supra note 59, at 1065 (“This is a promising time for an expansion of the right 
to counsel in civil cases.  The bench and the bar concur that there is a need for greater 
access to counsel; some states have even created pilot projects to provide legal assistance 
in certain civil proceedings to litigants who could not otherwise afford it.  Recent state 
legislation and state-court rulings have also supported the right to counsel in certain civil 
proceedings.”). 
206 See Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (“The fact is, being poor is terribly expensive.”). 
207 Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America:  The Current Unmet Civil Legal 
Needs of Low Income Americans, at 18 (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf (“The re-
cent state legal needs studies confirm earlier research and reveal that conservatively less 
than one in five—20 percent—of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive 
it.”); see also Henderson, supra note 56, at 78. 
